The Middle East has often been a focus of geopolitics, and politics witnessed frequent violence and instability together with the power tussle between different Middle Eastern countries. But the traditional balance of power has been shifting, and it is creating a new set of opportunities and risks. Despite decades of fruitless attempts at interventions, peace-making efforts, and switching sides, an interesting turn of events has put Donald Trump in a position where he may effect a sea change in Middle Eastern politics for the better—if he can manage to successfully chart his way through the maze of alliances and animosities that characterize the region.
As we enter the year 2025, Iran’s dreams of dominance in the Middle East region seem to have suffered huge blows. At the beginning of the year, Tehran was still assuming that it was on the attacking side. Due to continuing wars and political crises in the region, Iran expected to profit from the chaos resulting from the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. The consequences of the attack, however, have meant the withdrawal of much of Iran’s influence, especially in the Levant.
The former powerful “Axis of Resistance, comprising Iran-affiliated factions in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, is now defunct. Hamas and Hezbollah, two of Iran’s most trusted surrogates, have been badly damaged. The inability of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the emergence of new threats to Iran have made Tehran struggle with declining power in the region. Iran’s financial and military networks through which it has endeavored to achieve its regional goals have been severely impaired. The natural deaths of Hezbollah’s financiers and Iranian officials have also weakened Iran’s influence in the Middle East more.
This change of polarity might change the ground rules for a new round of talks, especially in the nuclear field. His administration has suggested the possibility of a better deal with Iran, a better deal than the 2015 nuclear deal signed by Obama. Unlike Obama’s deal, which left no provisions for Iran’s proxies, a new deal might be more inclusive in the sense that it might factor in the current international relations and the shifting allegiances. If such a deal is reached, Trump may take a diplomatically triumphant stance while his administration begins the process of demoting Iran’s imperialistic influence.
As the influence of Iran continues to decline, Türkiye is expected to rise to the occasion to seize power. Hamas continues to have a strong supporter in the region in the person of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has consistently been an enemy of Israel. Türkiye’s role in the Middle East is multifaceted: it has backed different organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and it has waged war in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The emergence of Turkish-backed forces in Syria and the expansion of groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have made Türkiye a significant regional actor.
However, the idea of a Türkiye-led “Axis of Resistance” has problems. Türkiye’s cooperation with organizations such as Hamas or the Syrian National Army (SNA) could plunge the region into further turmoil. The fundamentalists of the Muslim Brotherhood, who have gained power in Egypt and other Arab countries, can provoke a conflict. There is also a prospect of a new spiral of tensions within the anti-ISIS coalition due to Türkiye’s ability to shift attention to Syria’s Kurds, destabilizing the power balance of the Middle East once again.
As Iran declined in recent years, other regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar had a chance to boost their economic power and diplomacy level. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have escalated their lending and investments in the area, especially in nations that used to be dependent on Iran's support. Gulf states have been lending $34bn a year to countries in the Middle East and North Africa in 2021-2022, up from $17bn a year before the war. In terms of this shift, the new economic powers of the region are the Gulf states and Türkiye.
Türkiye, has been implicitly aligned with Syria and Iraq and is now wielding its military and diplomatic muscles over the two ravaged nations. The UAE has also had a role to play in determining this future, in which its financial contribution has been fundamental in providing support in the rebuilding of economies that have been torn down by conflict. These countries are using their economic assets to gain a bigger stake, which they sought in the region, and are acting as anti-Iranian nations.
But in this new European environment, Greece may have the promise of a great new role. Of course, being a NATO and EU member state, Greece has been maintaining relations with different countries of the Middle East and several Christian nations of this region. A country’s energy base and diplomatic capital make it possible to act successfully as a mediator between the Western world and the Middle East.
Leave alone the ideological influence of Türkiye, the economic and diplomatic supremacy of Türkiye has forced Greece to be more assertive on the international platform. The way through these changes will be in enhancing partnerships, especially with Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as other multilateral initiatives such as the Abraham Accord and Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.
The general economy has also greatly posed a massive calamity for the economy in Iran. The destruction of Iran's economic relations with the Arab countries, in particular the cutting of its relations with Syria and Lebanon, forces Iran to devote much of its resources to fulfilling its military and other financial obligations. Hezbollah in particular used to be formidable but has experienced funding problems and supply chain problems; Hamas too has had regular problems replacing manpower lost in Gaza. If Iran continues to lose its petro-service edge, then its adversaries—which include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye—are waiting in the wings to take advantage.
However, the last economic strategies have become easier in this context, especially in the respective countries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These countries have had to fill the gap of funding that previously Iran was able to directly or indirectly support, especially nations such as Lebanon and Syria. Trends, as Iran’s influence diminishes regionally, the Persian Gulf states are perceived more and more as providers of the desired economic rebuilding and order.
In the prospect of political power, Iran is in decline, and Türkiye is on the rise, along with other Gulf states, and this marks the end of an Iranian hegemonic period. There may be an opportunity to create a new, more stable regional architecture; however, the unpredictable nature of relationships in the region will have to be carefully managed. Regarding the future of the Middle East, the Trump administration, in contrast to Obama’s, with roots in the realities of the new world reborn from the ashes of the great recession of the late 2000s, is in an excellent position in its endeavor to seek a new GOP commitment to Middle East peace. Whether this opportunity can be fully realized remains to be seen: The Middle East is no longer the geographical area it used to be a few years back.
Edited by: Ece Nisanoğlu